Politburo 2.0: Renovation instead of dismantling

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This anniversary report of the Politburo 2.0 series aims to provide a retrospective view of internal processes in the Russian elite over the past 5 years, during Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term and in the lead up to his possible fourth (2018-2024).

This research project is based on proprietary methodology involving the usage of analysis of open sources, expert surveys, projections, and expert modelling (see Appendix 1, p. 12).

The first report of this series, Vladimir Putin’s Big Government and Politburo 2.0, published in August 2012, drew a significant response from Russian elites. Already on the day of publication, we have started receiving feedback from people whom we had described as members and candidate members of the Politburo 2.0, members of the Central Committee, and representatives of their teams.

We keep receiving this feedback, which enables us to constantly upgrade our model. First and foremost, the description of the ruling elites by experts turned out to be interesting to those elites.

The pinnacle of the Politburo 2.0’s public legitimation as a model was when a representative of businessman Gennady Timchenko made an official statement on the publication of the report’s 2016 issue, denying the assertion that Timchenko had left the president’s inner circle and Politburo 2.0.

Several thousand publications in the Russian and foreign media were dedicated to the model of Politburo 2.0. It is studied in top Russian and international universities, and not only in modules focusing on Russia, but also in theoretical courses as an example of original proprietary methodology of studying political elites.

Russian politicians and their consultants use modelling featuring the Politburo 2.0 model for the planning of careers and current activities.

Politburo 2.0’s emergence as an informal network-based governance structure was mostly circumstantial.

In 2012, after Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidential post, the Politburo 2.0 became a means of dismantling the tandem of 2008-2011, when the elites were distributed between two poles, however unequal – Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev, whose bilateral relations defined the domestic political agenda. The discontent of a part of Medvedev-oriented elites with the “reverse swap”, announced in autumn 2011, led to mass protests during the winter of 2011-2012.

Summer 2012 saw the establishment of an intra-elite system of checks and balances, where Prime Minister Medvedev was only one of several significant players, on par with the heads of the Rosneft and Rostec state corporations Igor Sechin and Sergey Chemezov, respectively, head of the Presidential Administration Sergey Ivanov and his first deputy Vyacheslav Volodin, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, businessmen Gennady Timchenko and Yuriy Kovalchuk.

Two factors contributed to the dispersion of resources among various groups – firstly, the formation of a pole adversarial to Medvedev in the fundamental energy industry, personified by Igor Sechin, and, secondly, a transition to the governance model of ‘big government’, whereby the president secured the role of actual leader, while the functionality of formal head of government was considerably limited. At the level of individual ministries and government agencies, the participants of this narrow circle formed their own networks of friendly senior officials and their deputies, officials of key departments. The distribution of power between groups affected Russian regions as well – virtually every member of the Politburo 2.0 formed his own pool of governors.

During the era of high energy prices, hydrocarbon energy played the role of the main trophy in the intra-elite power struggle and that of key foreign policy instrument. Hence, it
is logical that the Politburo 2.0 members represented in this industry had the most clout. The setup of formal and informal cooperation schemes with the elites of other countries fell within their zone of responsibility and increased their significance.

The entry of highly popular Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu into the Politburo 2.0 in late 2012 entailed the image “race of successors”. The internal competition of elite groups was increasing the significance of Vladimir Putin’s role as the moderator and referee of this competition.

The 2014 outbreak of civil and intra-elite conflict in Ukraine ended the “race of successors” and led to the change of power in this post-Soviet republic with the assistance of the US and the EU. Vladimir Putin’s response (Crimea’s accession and Russia’s support of militias in the South-East of Ukraine) has led simultaneously to the deterioration of relations with the West and to the growth of the president’s approval rating inside the country, as well as to the consolidation of the elite around the figure of its unconditional leader.

Putin’s attempt to resort to a proven move (“power projection in response to a threat from the South”) in order to stabilise relations with the West in the format of a military operation in Syria in 2015 and return to the precedent of the 2001 “anti-terrorist coalition” did not produce quick results.

The economy’s deterioration, plummeting hydrocarbon prices and ambiguous results of the declared “pivot to the East” heightened the competition for resources inside the Politburo 2.0. At the same time, fully-fledged members of the Politburo gained in significance by launching an expansion into the realms previously controlled by the Politburo 2.0 candidate members and the Central Committee’s members. This redistribution of resources took the form of an anti-corruption campaign, a bailout campaign for distressed banks, financial or administrative takeovers of competitors’ companies, restructuring of a number of ministries and government agencies. Those members of the elite who were affected by Western sanctions and received compensations in one way or another (in particular, Arkadiy Rotenberg) saw their symbolic shares go up. The influence of representatives of the military-industrial complex and the security corporation in general naturally grew in a country at war.

Following the logic of Putin’s model of “elite levelling”, the security services and regional authorities underwent severe purges and rotations. In both cases, Vladimir Putin pursued the policy of decreasing the role of the Politburo 2.0 participants, betting on new appointees, who may have had historical affiliation with one of clans, but owed their rise personally to the president. The clienteles of Politburo 2.0 members and candidate members, their children (“princelings”, if we follow the Chinese terminology), mid-level bureaucrats, representatives of the “court” (secretariat and security guards of Putin – aides) were used as talent pools.

In the long-term perspective, the abandonment of Politburo 2.0 with its systems of self-sufficient centres of power and its replacement by an analogue of Gosplan with much less ambitious and autonomous young technocrats appeared logical. Another non-negligible factor of elite shift is the age of numerous members of the ruling coalition. In 2015, the authorities launched the process of removing the “old guard” (V. Yakunin, E. Murov and others) and the entry of several members of the president’s inner circle into “free agency” (S.Ivanov, G.Timchenko). However, the establishment of a Gosplan 2.0 implies the availability of a new development model of the country. Given the lack of articulated strategy, the model of Politburo 2.0 with its system of informal supervisors of industries turned out more convenient for the solution of tactical tasks and survived until now for that reason.

Relations with the West remain the key question for the choice of development model. The strategy of establishing a network of foreign allies made of representatives of right-wing populist parties and movements using conservative rhetoric (Comintern 2.0 or the Conservative
International) failed. The victory of Donald Trump, accused of collusion with Russian elites, formed an anti-Russian consensus in the U.S. elites, rushed the new U.S. president into a trap and limited the capabilities of normalising U.S.-Russian ties both for President Trump and his successors. The defeat of Marine Le Pen and François Fillon at the French presidential election, the high likelihood of Angela Merkel retaining the office of German Chancellor and becoming an undisputed leader of Europe in the lead up to Brexit, the exacerbation of Eastern European nationalism, simultaneously using moderate Euroscepticism and the rhetoric of Russian threat as political fuel, - all these factors do not provide grounds for optimism about EU-Russian relations.

Russian elites are facing a bifurcation of a mobilisation model with the militarisation of the economy, on the one hand, and the attempt to launch a new wave of modernisation on the other hand. And today the developing competition inside the Politburo 2.0 is not about the 2018 presidential election. Its outcome is virtually predetermined by the maintenance of the intra-elite balance, the high approval rating of Vladimir Putin, and a lack of serious competitors both inside and outside the ruling corporation.

Alexey Navalny who is attempting to position himself as the No. 1 opposition leader is rather playing the role of an instrument of sorting out differences between the members of Politburo 2.0, as public conflicts between them are a taboo. Navalny was used twice to knock out members of the ruling elite harbouring successor ambitions – in 2013, against Sergey Sobyanin, and in 2017, against Dmitry Medvedev. The majority of Politburo 2.0 members are not interested in returning to the tandem model. In the context of the current presidential campaign, Navalny’s function was, in all likelihood, exhausted by his knockout of Medvedev from potential presidential candidates in 2018.

It is possible to suppose that the questions of the presidential campaign’s intrigue and the formalisation of its predictable result are of little significance to Putin. The legitimacy of the election results in any event will be disputed by Western countries. The contribution of one or another group to the predefined victory will not become an indulgence for it or a resource of boosting its influence. Moreover, Putin’s presidential campaign, launched in June 2017, has a clearly marked anti-elite character – “the president together with the common people against bureaucrat fat-cats”.

At the same time, the ruling elites do not have a demand for the increase in competitiveness in domestic politics. The observation of risks, entailed by the high level of political competition in the West, does not create enthusiasm within the Russian political elites. The examples of Donald Trump who had won the election and was constrained from hands to feet by the Congress, the sabotage of bureaucratic apparatus and by liberal media, newly-elected Emmanuel Macron’s quick loss of popularity, Brexit and the Pyrrhic victory of the Tories at the UK parliamentary election, the lack of a single political will in the European Union, the European migration crisis, the terrorist threat and social divide in Western countries do not incite a desire to return to the path of copying Western institutions. Dependence on the political electoral calendar is perceived as weakness, and the stability of the Russian ruling elite is viewed as a competitive advantage in the geopolitical game in an era of turbulence.
The simplification of foreign policy patterns and the scepticism of political elites regarding regime liberalisation as a way of treating economic stagnation led the political regime’s top leaders to simplify their scheme of priorities. The realm of foreign policy underwent a militarisation, evidenced by the personality of the new Russian ambassador to the United States. Domestic politics became a part of social policy and finance. The energy industry, metals and mining, transport and infrastructure are perceived as a single sector. Digital economy is becoming a trump card, where various players are attempting to position themselves, while having very divergent ideas of what information economy and innovations are.
Given the issues with maintaining a meaningful agenda, members of the Politburo 2.0 can increase their influence by having a clear project for the country in general or at least for themselves and their groups for the duration of Putin’s next term.

In this context, strange as it may seem, Dmitry Medvedev manifests the highest stability as a member of the Politburo 2.0 and the participant of the next ruling elite coalition. On the one hand, he is the most experienced member of the ruling group after Putin, having a track record of working as prime minister and as president. On the other hand, Medvedev has repeatedly proven his loyalty to Putin and has skilfully mastered an aikido-style stratagem of weakening himself in the interest of “self-preservation”. Being the youngest member of the Politburo 2.0 (52 years), he possesses an important time resource.

Medvedev has at least three employment options after May 2018. Those may include: 1) keeping the office of prime minister; 2) moving to Gazprom and reclaiming the position of chief energy player from Igor Sechin; 3) moving to the Supreme Court and obtaining the status of informal civil supervisor of the law enforcement sector.

Sergey Shoygu may feel quite secure by virtue of being the defence minister of a country at war. He has a considerable shot at establishing a new superministry under his auspices (the Defence Ministry + the Emergencies Ministry) and at preserving and even expanding his regional quota. Shoygu’s risks may arise from possible force majeure circumstances in the hostilities area.

Sergey Chemezov, Head of the Rostec state corporation has been gaining influence most dynamically among Politburo 2.0 members, as he solidified his position in the presidential administration, the security services and regional elites, and expanded his control into the Uralvagonzavod machine-building company. The programme of military rearmament, planned to be completed in 2021, falls within his zone of responsibility. The risks this group is running include its strengthening, which its opponents can report to the president as excessive and needing levelling, failures in the implementation of significant projects, the lowering of Chemezov’s personal motivation. However, the so-called “collective Chemezov”, the military-industrial complex group, will inevitably be one of key elite players. Industry and Trade Minister Manturov is one of the potential contenders for its leadership.

Businessman Yuriy Kovalchuk is considered an informal supervisor of the research sector and an adept of the innovation economy, and holds significant stakes in finance and media. In case the modernisation scenario is selected, Kovalchuk may end up in the core of that coalition.

Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin is one of the few Politburo 2.0 members to have a clear and tangible project for the entire duration of the new presidential term, the project of housing renovation in Moscow which intends to radically change the city’s face. At the same time, the project will ensure the involvement of a large number of elite groups in this capital-intensive project, which are becoming natural allies of the mayor. At the same time, Sobyanin has preserved and partially renewed the talent pool of affiliated governors in the Ural region (having replaced Perm region’s leader Viktor Basargin by Maxim Reshetnikov). Despite the absence of manifest personal ambitions and the demonstration of a profound involvement in the city-level agenda, Sobyanin, nonetheless, remains the No. 2 candidate to the office of prime minister.
At the same time, three influential Politburo 2.0 members may have difficulties with the agenda that they can offer to the president.

At the first glance, Igor Sechin appears to be at the peak of his power. He is deservedly viewed as one of the most loyal members of Putin’s team. His collection of recent victories over the past years include the obtainment of control over Rosneft Gaz and Bashneft, privatisation of a stake in Rosneft, growth of informal clout in electric power, execution of significant international deals, the arrest of a number of governors and of Economic Development Minister Alexey Ulyukayev. However, Sechin’s pushy style of governance rallies a broad elite coalition against him. If the oil industry runs the risk of consolidation around one person, this infringes upon the interests of such serious players as Lukoil, Gazpromneft, Tatneft. Criticism is attracted by Sechin’s transgression of his responsibility boundaries, Rosneft’s financial results and its costly international projects, possible negative consequences of the lawsuit against the Sistema holding for the national investment environment, insistent use of coercive instruments, demoralising the management elite. For many members of the ruling class, the arrest of Economic Development A. Ulyukayev became an example of violation of unwritten rules of interaction. A number of businesspeople believe that the litigation against the Sistema holding creates the risk of precedent of punishing a company for the implementation of standard corporate procedures, used by multiple market operators. This is the main reason for tacit support of Sistema’s main shareholder Vladimir Yevtushenkov by various elite players.

It would be incorrect to say that in the past few years Rosneft’s way only consisted of successful expansion. The standoff with Politburo 2.0 candidate member and head of Transneft Nikolay Tokarev ended with the tactical win by Putin’s fellow teammate from his times at Dresden rezidentunta. Sechin’s resources with the security services decreased, following the disbandment of the Federal Drug Control Service headed by Sechin’s partner Viktor Ivanov and the dismissal of several officers of the Investigative Committee and the FSB who were close to the head of Rosneft.

This is why the choice of inter-elite strategy is becoming a challenge for “the Real Igor Ivanovich” as Sechin is often informally nicknamed, and possibly an establishment of a coalition, which is something he was not inclined to in the past.

Vyacheslav Volodin, one of the few professional politicians in Russia, has maintained a ramified regional clientele and an informal influence upon the parliamentary political parties and the United Popular Front, after having moved from the Presidential Administration to the position of the State Duma’s speaker. The federal parliament’s status has considerably grown due to active work with the agenda, the toughening of its position vis-à-vis the government and regional authorities (including the Moscow city government), claim to conduct an independent review of bills sponsored by the executive branch. However, the de-facto merger of all parliament parties into a single ruling pro-Putin coalition reduces the influence of the leaders of formally opposition parties (G. Zyuganov, V. Zhirinovsky, and S. Mironov) and the significance of the parliament as a space representing the entire society. The preservation of the regional clientele’s loyalty is facing challenges.

Arkadiy Rotenberg, the most successful manager of large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the bridge linking the Crimean and Taman peninsulas, has also been performing the function of communicator with foreign economic elites for a long while. However, his entry into sanction lists, the general cooling in relations with the West and the challenges faced by new projects in the East are creating difficulties in strategic planning for his group. His informal supervision of the Russian Railways can become disputed in the context of
Putin’s long-term strategy seeking to centralise the management of state corporations around himself.

We can highlight a group of the Politburo 2.0 candidate members who have the potential to become its fully-fledged members.

First of all, this is the case of the head of the Presidential Administration Anton Vaino and his first deputy Sergey Kiriyenko.

Despite his relatively young age and historic affiliation with Chemezov’s group, Vaino is becoming one of the most trusted confidants of the president and is gradually increasing his informal influence and administrative experience.

Kiriyenko and Putin go a long way back together, he has a reputation of efficient manager and a solid image potential. It is important that he managed to maintain his control over the Rosatom nuclear corporation after his departure to the Presidential Administration. We do not rule out the possibility that the president values not so much Kiriyenko’s political experience but rather his history of managerial success in non-hydrocarbon energy industry.

Sberbank’s CEO Herman Gref, one of beneficiaries of the overhaul of the banking sector, and head of the Centre for Strategic Research Alexey Kudrin are competing with each other for the role of the architect and executor of economic, social and, possibly, political reforms. They are also bidding in the informal tender for the role of supervisor of the information economy sector, which is deemed to have promising prospects. There is no shortage of contenders for this role – presidential aide Andrey Belousov (whose influence is rising) and First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov (his influence is decreasing) are both in the race.

Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yuriy Trutnev is considered as a claimant to the role of a technocratic prime minister, endowed with a strong will and a capacity to execute projects.

As for the law enforcement realm, head of the National Guard Viktor Zolotov has been drastically gaining influence, after having been the brain and the executive behind this new security service project. At the same time, Zolotov has a solid informal clout in the FSB (in particular, the FSB’s Deputy Director Evgeny Zinichev is his protégée) and the Ministry of Interior, in addition to having his own pool of affiliated governors.

Head of the Chechen republic Ramzan Kadyrov is probably the only Russian regional leader to have an autonomous law enforcement resource and a system of informal economic influence in other Russian regions. Kadyrov’s security powers are a factor not only in domestic politics but also in foreign policy. Furthermore, Kadyrov is claiming the role of communicator with Islamic countries and that of the leader of Russian Muslims. Considering the weakening of Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov’s positions (the bankruptcy of the region’s second largest commercial bank Tatfondbank, non-renewal of the treaty of delimitation of powers between the federal centre and the regional authorities, rise of intra-elite disputes in the region), Kadyrov is pulling a part of this symbolic resource toward himself. We do not rule out a possibility that Minnikhanov, who is running the risk of falling out of the Politburo 2.0 candidate members, may gain new allies interested in balancing Kadyrov.

Let us now have a closer look at the dynamics inside the body of the Politburo 2.0 candidate members.

Inside the security services, the system of checks and balances still remains in place, despite the growing profile of V. Zolotov. The coalition of S. Chemezov-Yu. Chayka-V. Zolotov competes with the tandem of A.Bortnikov and A.Bastrykin, who are backed on a number of questions by the Security Council Secretary N. Patrushev. Despite being weakened, the group of E. Shkolov, nonetheless, is keeping the V. Kolokoltsev atop the Ministry of Interior. The SVR
Director S. Naryshkin’s activity in the media appears to be a preparation for a transition to a new opportunity. The role of the Supreme Court’s Chairman V. Lebedev is on the rise with the preparation of the judicial reform being underway.

Inside the administrative and technical bloc, apart from the aforementioned A. Belousov and I. Shuvalov, we note the stable position of Elvira Nabiullina whose term as the Central Bank’s chief was extended and who came out a winner in several difficult intra-elite conflict (Tatfondbank and Yugra commercial banks). The president’s communication with the head of the Audit Chamber T. Golikova has become more intensive.

The political activity of large business (both state-run and private companies, which are increasingly merging with the SOEs) is mostly reactive rather than proactive, and is confined to the regions of its operations. Investment in partisan political projects has dwindled. Large private business, especially originating from the 1990s, is reducing its political influence, and gradually these “fellow passengers” will be sidelined from the group of Politburo 2.0 candidate members to the group of members of the Central Committee.

In the political bloc, we note the growth of ideological and informal influence of Bishop Tikhon (Shevkunov) that is taking place at the backdrop of lowering significance of the leaders of parliament opposition parties (the CPRF, the LDPR and «Just Russia»), who are risking to be downgraded to a lower league – members of the Central Committee. It is exactly the understanding of the weak positions that pushes the long-time leaders of these parties G. Zyuganov, V. Zhirinovsky, and S. Mironov to fight for a place in the presidential race and reject the scenario of testing new players inside their parties.

Speaking of potential new contenders claiming to enter the Politburo 2.0 as candidate members, the competition of political projects with meaningful content provides a situational boost to the role of gubernatorial veterans who are in possession of an original ideology – the unsinkable Aman Tuleev (paternalist authoritarianism, Kemerovo region in southern Siberia), Anatoly Artamonov (investor-oriented economy, Kaluga region – a key logistical hub near Moscow), Evgeny Savchenko (moderate Russian nationalism, Belgorod region bordering Ukraine).

A new group of law enforcement and technocrat elite is formed and getting training in the regions or at the level of heads of state-owned companies, deputy ministers and deputy heads of other agencies. Among relatively experienced but also young leaders we highlight Dmitry Kobylin who is informally supervising the Stavropol region apart from his own Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region, and Andrey Vorobyov who was the first to transform his image from a “princeling” to a “technocrat”. Highlights from the new “conscription” includes former presidential aides Alexey Dymin and Dmitry Mironov, as well as the former head of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives Andrey Nikitin.

Among promising federal-level managers we would like to mention ministers Denis Manturov and Alexander Novak, as well as the Russian Railways CEO Oleg Belozerov.
Forecast:

1. The Politburo 2.0 model has a chance to be maintained until the electoral cycle of 2021-2024. During this time, the personnel composition of that Politburo 2.0 may change significantly;

2. Two wide coalitions are being formed inside the Politburo 2.0: the mobilisation coalition (military-industrial complex + security services, with Chemezov, the Chaykas, Zolotov and Shoig as its core) and the modernisation one (the government’s liberal bloc, private business, with potential participants including Medvedev, the Kovalchuks, Sobyanin, Kudrin, Gref). The bulk of members and candidates members of the Politburo 2.0 may end up in either camp, depending on the situation. The most likely outcome is that a final strategic decision will not be made and the programme adopted for implementation will be a mixed one, or even be developed on the go;

3. The government formed in May 2018 года will run the risk of becoming the government of unpopular reforms, which is why its eventual prime minister’s chances of becoming Putin’s successor will be on the low side;

4. Provided that Putin maintains a good physical shape (which is very likely), the discussion of the successor issue will actually begin during the preparation of the 2021 parliamentary election, since the next parliament will be a significant element of power transition. It is possible that Putin develops a particular status after his departure from the president’s office (“Russian-style ayatollah”). A lot will depend on the outcome of the US presidential election in 2020;

5. Further deterioration of relations with the West is virtually inevitable and will provoke conflicts on Russia’s perimeter. In turn, this will push the Politburo 2.0 toward the mobilisation scenario.
Appendix 1

Methodological basis of the Politburo 2.0 report series

Network analysis remains the main method of creating a working model of elite interaction, starting from the very first report that was published five years ago. It is based on semi-formalised interviews with the representatives of the elites, which were conducted personally, participatory observation, projections-based methods and analysis of open sources.

The Politburo 2.0 model relies upon works that had become the classic of political science.

First of all, this is neo-institutionalism. The creation of our model was most influenced by the concept of “the natural state” shaping the elite coalition through the control and distribution of rent resources, which had been outlined in the 2009 book Violence and Social Orders by Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast.

Secondly, we share the view of elites expressed by Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca as early as in the beginning of the 20th century in his seminal work The Ruling Class. In the book, he departed from the traditional meritocratic description of elites and focused on the political question of domination.

Finally, an important contribution was made by works in the field of social network theory, which descend from Emile Durkheim’s classic works and have received a revival thanks to the works of Charles Tilly and Mark Granovetter.

Our principal hypothesis always remained the point that it is the configuration of elite networks around the president (as the repository of supreme power) and not formal offices in the power hierarchy that defines the actual configuration of political forces. This assertion is valid as regards Russia, since we are noting that a number of conditions are still being met:

1. low level of development of the system of checks and balances;
2. low level of institutionalisation of social processes;
3. high level of transaction costs in public activity
4. historically developed model of power legitimacy attained through the link between the head of state and the people.
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Main research agenda and services:

- Research of international practices of political and lobbying campaigns;
- Research of political and economic processes in the post-Soviet space;
- Monitoring of the elites’ activities in Russia and the CIS countries;
- Research of Eurasian energy security, military and political security issues;
- Exclusive analysis for government bodies and private customers.

Research Projects

Permanent monitoring projects

- Monitoring of regional elections in Russia (since 1996);
- Rating of political survivability of governors in Russia (jointly with the Centre of Political Conjuncture of Russia, subsequently with the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation, since 2007);
- Politburo 2.0 – analysis of elite groups of the Russian Federation (since 2012);
- Assessment of political risks for foreign investors in post-Soviet countries: comparative analysis (since 2013).

2017

- Project “Monitoring of gubernatorial elections in Russia”;
- Report “Technological lessons from the French presidential election for Russia”
- Report “The Brexit-effect in the Russian political system?”;
- Report on the positioning scenarios of Vladimir Putin in the presidential electoral campaign;
- Autopsy of Hillary’s campaign: how Trump won. Analysis of the U.S. presidential election from the standpoint of political technologies.

2016

- The 2016 referendum in the UK: technological aspects;
- The institution of primaries. Global experience.

2015

- Mid-term election in the U.S. Congress and prospects of the U.S. presidential election: technological aspect;
- British parliamentary election: new trends in political technologies;
- Assessment of political risks for foreign investors in the countries of the Caucasus: comparative analysis;
- Lobbying competition in the Russian pharmaceutical market (confidential report);
- Lobbying competition over suburban railway transport in Russia (confidential report).
2014
- Politburo 2.0 and post-Crimean Russia;
- Technological aspects of 2014 elections to the European Parliament;
- Monitoring of gubernatorial elections in Russia;
- Lobbying competition in the Russian automotive industry (confidential report);
- Ukrainian revolution: analysis of the first stage and development prospects;

2013
- Assessment of political risks for foreign investors in Central Asian countries: comparative analysis;
- Politburo 2.0 in the Lead-Up to a Reset of Elite Groups;
- Political strategies of new Russian governors, appointed in late 2011-2012;
- Political Survival Rating of Russian Governors;
- Investment Potential of Uzbekistan: Political Risk Analysis;
- First Anniversary of Dmitry Medvedev’s Cabinet: Results and Prospects;
- Mayor of Moscow Elections: Scenario Programming of Campaigns and Candidates’ Reputation Management;
- Political Strategies of 2013 Governor Candidates.

2012
- System of Presidential Elections: Russian and Foreign Experience;
- French Presidential Elections: Analysis of Political Technologies;
- U.S. Presidential Elections: Analysis of Political Technologies;
- Presidential Elections in Turkmenistan: Political and Economic Risks of Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov’s second term;
- Turkmenistan's Investment Potential: Political Risk Analysis;
- Vladimir Putin's Greater Government and Politburo 2.0.

2011
- Social Engineering for Russian Modernization (based on survey of moods of mono-cities inhabitants);
- Post-crisis situation in mono-cities: problems and solutions.

2010
- 5th Anniversary of Governor Appointment System in Russia. Time to Return to Direct Elections!;
- 2010 Presidential Elections in Poland. Main Candidates and Tactics;
- Pre-election Situation in the Kyrgyz Republic;
- Future of the South Stream Project;
- Political Influence Index of the Heads of 100 Largest Cities in Russia (jointly with the Petersburg Politics Foundation);
2009

- Geopolitical Lobbying over the NATO Eastern Enlargement;
- Monitoring of the 2009 European Parliament Election;
- Images of Russia and the United States in the Lead-Up to Relationship Reset;
- Algorithms for conflict resolution in Russian mono-cities;
- Foreign Influence in the 2010 Ukrainian Presidential Elections;
- Russia’s Recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s Independence: One Year After;
- Monitoring of the Lobbying Struggle over the Federal Law on Foundations of State Regulation of Trade in the Russian Federation;
- Economic Situation in Belarus and Vectors of Geopolitical Lobbying in the President Lukashenko’s Team;
- Lobbying in Russia and Pressure Groups: What Changed during the First Year of the Putin-Medvedev Tandem;

2008

- Political Survival Rating of Russian Governors (jointly with the Centre of Russian Current Political Situation and the Petersburg Politics Foundation), 2007-2013.
- Conflict in South Ossetia: Geopolitical and Image Consequences for Russia.

2007

- Pressure Groups and Lobbying Technologies in Ukraine (jointly with Kiev Gorshenin Institute of Management Issues);
- Energy Potential of Ukraine (jointly with Free Europe Foundation, United Communications and Sofia Center);
- United Economic Space Project lobbying. Pressure groups and lobbying technologies in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan: comparative analysis (2006-2007);
- Lobbying by Foreign Companies in Turkmenistan;
- Scenarios of Power Succession in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Experience and Perspectives;
- Russian Energy Strategy in Eurasia: Priorities and Technology of Implementation.

2006

- Optimization of Russia’s Administrative and Territorial Division: First Results and Future Steps;
- Attitudes of Ukrainian Electorate and Experts towards the Prospect of Joining Accession (jointly with Sofia Center for Social Technologies and Army, Conversion and Disarmament Research Center).
2005

- Universal Electoral Technologies and Country-Specific Features: Experience of Russian Political Advisers;

2004

- President-2004. Comparative Analysis of Electoral Technologies Implemented in Russian, Ukrainian and U.S. Presidential Elections;
- Psychological Portraits of Candidates for Ukrainian Presidency;